

Research Paper

Early Wittgenstein and Placing God and Religion in the Mystical Realm

Payam Jahandar Lashaki^{*1},

Abdurrazzaq Hesamifar²

¹ MA Student of Philosophy of Religion at Imam Khomeini International University (IKIU), Qazvin, Iran ² Professor of Philosophy Department at Imam Khomeini International University (IKIU), Faculty of Literature and Humanity, Philosophy Department.), Qazvin, Iran. ahesamifar@hum.ikiu.ac.ir



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Abstract

In the first period of his intellectual development and by proposing the picture theory of meaning in which he agree Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein tried to define boundaries of meaningfull propositions and the boundary between what is sayable and what is not. By proposing this theory, he says that the propositions which include categories like the transcendent fact/God, religion and of course the other normative things, though the logical form can be regarded in them, but they do not have cognitive function. By passing through the boundaries of language, these propositions do not include any meaning and they are regarded as nonsensical and deformed propositions. But this was not the end of his way. After that he took step from the realm of silence toward the realm of mystic and called the transcendent fact/God and religion mystical facts. relying on Wittgenstein's early works and the works of the period of transition this article will assesse and analize his view on the transcendent fact/God and religion and the ideas of his commentatots on this regard.

Extended abstract

1. Introduction

The center of gravity of Wittgenstein's philosophical system can be viewed as his

analysis of language in both the first and second periods of his intellectual transformation, which led to two different philosophical systems, and this can be seen mainly in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophi*-

Email: payam.jahandar.lashaki@gmail.com

^{*}Corresponding Author: Payam Jahandar Lashaki Address: MA Student of Philosophy of Religion at Imam Khomeini International University (IKIU), Qazvin, Iran



cus known as Tractatus, which was the result of his thoughts in the first period of his philosophical life. Wittgenstein's ideas have played a significant role in general in the path of analytical philosophy and specifically in the refinement of propositions in philosophy; because by determining the limits and gaps of the borders that can be expressed in the form of meaningful statements, he opened a window to show things beyond experience and transcendence in the form of things to show, which as a result led him to the mystical area of these things and invitation to silence about it. The place of the transcendent matter/God and religion in the field of the mysterious fact realm in Wittgenstein's thought was in the aura of ambiguity and it is a subject that has not been dealt with as it should and perhaps has not been dealt with from innovative perspectives; therefore, by analyzing and examining the works of Wittgenstein's early period and transitional period, as well as examining the opinions of some commentators of his works, this study will reveal how the analvsis of language in early Wittgenstein's thought leads us to the realm of mystery, which is the home of the transcendent matter/God, religion and other matters of value and basically why the mysterious area is based on the analysis of language. In addition, an effort is made to reveal the necessity of the mystical realm within the analysis of language to examine the call for silence regarding the above process and show that the call for silence in this regard is not only the end of Wittgenstein's early thoughts but also the beginning of a new path in the early period of his intellectual life.

2. Research Method

The method of this research, like most philosophical studies, is analytical, and the attempt is to achieve the desired result by analyzing the works of Wittgenstein's early period and transitional period, as well as examining the works of his commentators.

3. Research Findings

In this research, it was found out that Wittgenstein made a distinction between things that can be said and things that can be shown, based on which metaphysical propositions are classified as unsayable things due to the lack of reference to the image in the world, and it can only be shown that no signification can be found in them. As a result, it is placed in the realm of mystery, and silence is his only suggestion to cross the boundaries of language.

4. Conclusion

Since, according to Wittgenstein, empirical sciences leave the basic problems of human life completely untouched, it may be understood that the mysterious realm is an eternal facet of this world. This means that the transcendent matter/God and religion can be understood in the sphere of emotions and feelings, and because of their asymmetry with any real thing, any knowledge acquisition about them is ruled out. In another way, it doesn't seem that the non-revealing of the transcendent fact/God in the world is due to his indifference to the world or reasons of this kind; because basically, making a being, who is determined in the realm of transcendence and a kind of paralinguistic, evident in the world of facts is completely pointless. And since, in Wittgenstein's opinion, silence is considered the linguistic limit of logic, it can be seen that metaphysical propositions refer to a reality that cannot be contained in words.

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Far have collaborated in writing this article. The corresponding author takes responsibility for this article.

Conflict of interest

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