



Research Paper

A Critical Evaluation of the Views of Muhaqqiq Khafri and Fazel Qushchi on the Universality of Divine Power: With Emphasis on the Position of Fayaz Lahiji.

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Abstract

This research deals with the critical evaluation of Mohaghegh Khofari and Fazel Ghoshchi's views on the universality of divine power, relying on Fayyaz Lahiji's opinions. Fazel Ghoshchi and Mohaghegh Khofari believe in the generality of God's power and the possibility of creating anything, even intellectual impossibility and evil. They both believe that God's power is unlimited and absolute, and no condition, even the condition of being impossible, can limit his power. Fayyaz Lahiji, on the other hand, by accepting the infinite power of God, considers it beyond his ability to create the impossible and evil. He believes that the creation of the impossible and evil is not only incompatible with divine wisdom, but also meaningless and impossible. By distinguishing between absolute power and relative power, Lahiji argues that God's power, although unlimited, is directed toward possibilities and does not include impossibilities and evil. This research examines the pieces of evidence and arguments of these three thinkers with the analytical-critical method, and finally, relying on philosophical foundations, Lahiji's view on the generality of divine power is preferred. Since this research is organized based on the notes of Mohaghegh Khofari and Fayaz Lahiji on Ghoshchi's description of abstraction, in some cases, the expression of Khajah Toosi has been used to better explain the topic. This research shows that the justifications and reasons of Fazel Ghoshchi and Mohaghegh Khofari in the issue of the generality of divine power face many problems.



Extended Abstract

1. Discussion

Khafri and Qushchi both argue that divine power is unlimited and not restricted even by logical contradiction. Qushchi uses an analogy between divine and human agency to justify God's ability to produce both good and evil. However, this analogy is fundamentally flawed, as it equates the divine with the contingent and morally fallible human agent—a move that violates the principle of *tanzih* (divine transcendence). Moreover, their interpretation lacks a robust account of divine wisdom (*hikmah*) and fails to resolve the tension between power and justice.

Fayaz Lahiji, in contrast, introduces a distinction between absolute omnipotence and directed omnipotence toward the realm of real possibilities. For Lahiji, God's power extends over all things that are logically and ontologically possible, but not to logical absurdities or intrinsic moral evils. Drawing upon the notion that evil is non-being ('adam), he argues that God, as pure being (*ṣirf al-wujūd*), cannot be the direct cause of non-being. Evil is either a privation ('adamī) or an accidental by-product of a greater good (*bi'l-'araḍ*), never an intended result of divine action.

Lahiji's critique of Khafri's view is especially important: while Khafri allows God to create beings whose goodness outweighs their evil, Lahiji insists that any association of God with evil, however minor, violates the

metaphysical nature of God as absolute good. He further elaborates a reconciliation framework by reinterpreting the dualistic cosmologies of Manichaeans and Zoroastrians. According to Lahiji, the “two principles” they refer to (Yazdan and Ahriman) can be understood not as two real entities but as metaphors for existence (*wujūd*) and possibility (*imkān*), with the latter symbolizing the source of privation rather than a real agent of evil.

2. Conclusion

This study concludes that the views of Qushchi and Khafri, while aiming to defend the absoluteness of divine power, are undermined by logical inconsistencies, theological contradictions, and a lack of attention to divine wisdom. In contrast, Fayaz Lahiji's approach provides a balanced, coherent, and philosophically rigorous model that safeguards both the universality and intelligibility of divine power. His framework affirms that divine omnipotence must operate within the bounds of what is truly possible—logically, morally, and ontologically—and not be reduced to arbitrary force.

This conclusion upholds God's omnipotence in full while preserving the harmony of other divine attributes, such as wisdom, justice, and goodness. Lahiji's contribution stands as a significant development in Islamic philosophical theology, offering a powerful response to classical theological dilemmas and enriching contemporary discourse on divine agency.