A Comparative Study of the Authority of Speculative Opinions in Beliefs from the Perspective of Usulists and Theologians and Its Impact on Imitation in Doctrinal Knowledge

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Law, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Mazandaran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology, University of Mazandaran

3 Student of Roohi Babol Seminary

10.22080/jepr.2025.28061.1224

Abstract

It can be said that the most important component of the propositions of any religion is its doctrinal statements, while propositions related to ethics and laws occupy a secondary position. This is because it is through the formation of correct beliefs that one finds the path to happiness. It is also evident that the means of attaining knowledge are not limited to the acquisition of science; rather, restricting these means solely to scientific knowledge might make the formation of a doctrinal system for the general public difficult.
With this in mind, when we study the words of the great osul scholars and rational thinking, we clearly observe that most scholars do not assign significant value to the knowledge derived from conjecture. However, these conjectures have become a central focus in jurisprudential issues. The question then arises: what’s the reason for this distinction or in other words, why are conjectures disregarded in doctrinal matters?
Ultimately, we concluded that in matters of belief where the acquisition of knowledge is not required, a general belief suffices, and the reason of closure does not work. However, in doctrinal matters such as the knowledge of God, where acquiring knowledge is necessary we may regard knowledge as a necessary precondition. If one is unable to acquire knowledge, then there is no obligation to seek conjecture.

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