Nietzsche's eternal return as the eternal repetition of difference in Gilles Deleuze's thought

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1 PhD in Contemporary Philosophy - Department of Theology, Farhangian University, Hamedan, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran

10.22080/jepr.2025.28835.1268

Abstract

This article examines and critiques Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, which is presented as an ambiguous issue in Nietzsche's philosophy. Therefore, it has many interpretations, one of which is Deleuze's interpretation. This article explains this interpretation using a descriptive-analytical-critical approach. In order to complete the problem of temporality in Bergson, who depicts the role of the future vague and weak, Deleuze goes to Nietzsche and his eternal return in order to correctly draw the third side of the triangle of past, present and future, in order to provide the necessary and suitable platform for the Spinozian concept of "expression". According to Deleuze, the eternal return is the return of what becomes; or it is the same becoming same, rather than being and existing; It means something that is confirmed in becoming. In fact, the eternal return is not an identity thought at all, but a mixed and completely different thought, so such a return is not the return of the "same" that returns eternally; It does not mean repeating history and sequences of being; Rather, it is the return of the self, the self that belongs to a multiplicity, a multiplicity that is different; In other words, eternal return is the repetition of difference. And what we always face is the difference. This difference that constitutes Deleuze's Nietzschean spirit. Of course, Deleuze seeks to express his own view more through Nietzsche's language; that is, he seeks to justify his own view rather than explain Nietzsche's view.

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