Religious Rationality and the Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue:A Comparative Analysis of the Views of Avicenna and Paul Tillich

The relationship between reason and faith, and its implications for interreligious dialogue, is a central concern in contemporary philosophy of religion. This study asks: on what epistemological and ontological foundations is religious rationality constructed in the thought of Avicenna and Paul Tillich, and how do these foundations shape the possibility of interfaith dialogue? Using a descriptive–analytical and comparative method, the study examines the key components of religious rationality in their works.

The findings show that Avicenna grounds religious rationality in the harmony between reason and revelation, the authority of demonstrative reasoning, and the capacity of intellect to apprehend universal truths. Within this framework, interreligious dialogue becomes possible on the basis of shared rational principles and common ontological assumptions. In contrast, Tillich situates religious rationality within an existential and interpretive horizon, emphasizing lived faith, symbolic religious language, and the notion of “ultimate concern.” Dialogue, in this view, emerges from shared human existential conditions and symbolic structures of meaning.

The study concludes that the divergence between these thinkers does not concern the rationality of religion itself, but rather its foundational basis. Avicenna represents a demonstrative–epistemic model of rationality, while Tillich advances an existential–hermeneutic one. Interreligious dialogue, therefore, can be understood through the integration of two levels: rational comprehension of truth and existential interpretation of meaning. This dual framework preserves religious identities while offering a coherent theoretical basis for mutual understanding across traditions.