Revisiting Philip Quinn’s Divine Command Theory in Light of John Searle’s Speech Act Theory

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1 Department of Philosophy of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.

2 Ph.D. in Philosophy of ethics, University of Qom

10.22080/jepr.2026.31668.1334

Abstract

The problem of the origin of moral obligation and the challenge posed by the Euthyphro dilemma have long constituted the primary obstacles to the acceptance of Divine Command Theory (DCT). Employing a conceptual-analytic method, the present article offers an elucidation of the nature of divine commands by synthesizing John Searle’s Speech Act Theory with Philip Quinn’s Divine Command Theory. According to the foundational formulation of Quinn’s DCT, an act is morally obligatory if and only if God has commanded it.This study proposes that by analyzing divine commands as speech acts—specifically within the categories of “directives” and “declarations”—morality can be conceived as an institutional reality constructed by Divine intentionality. Within this framework, the direction of fit is “world-to-word”; implying that the Divine utterance itself serves as the ontological ground for the creation of normative reality. Based on this approach, it can be argued that divine commands are neither mere reports of independent, a priori moral truths, nor are they arbitrary edicts devoid of conditions of satisfaction. Ultimately, it appears that bridging the philosophy of language and theology in this research not only offers a viable resolution to the Euthyphro dilemma but also yields a more coherent understanding of God’s absolute sovereignty in conjunction with the normative validity of morality.

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