A Critical Examination of David Hume’s Susceptibility to the Science of His Time in His Turn toward a Critical Conception of the Principle of Causation

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1 Postdoctoral Researcher in Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.

2 Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.

10.22080/jepr.2025.29898.1292

Abstract

David Hume’s significance in the intellectual transformations of the Enlightenment is undeniable. On the one hand, he maintained a deep commitment to the scientific outlook and the achievements of modern science; on the other, he adopted one of the most critical perspectives on religion and the idea of God. Hume extensively drew upon the scientific knowledge of his age to reinforce his skeptical arguments against traditional theology. One of the most prominent domains of this engagement was his critique of the principle of causality—a principle that held a central place in classical arguments for the existence of God. By employing the scientific and philosophical advances of his time, Hume argued that causality is not an objective necessity inherent in the world but rather a mental and psychological habit formed through the repetition of experience. Consequently, reliance on the principle of causality as a foundation for proving God’s existence and explaining the relationship between the world and a transcendent origin loses its philosophical validity. This article critically examines how Hume’s encounter with contemporary science shaped his skeptical stance on causality and explores the implications of this critique for religious rationality.

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