Metaphysical or physical foundations of empirical judgments in Aristotelian logic ,Hume and Kant

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Associate Professor of lamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Ferdowsi, Mashhad, Iran

10.22080/jepr.2026.29180.1279

Abstract

Science and philosophy have always been concerned with universal, comprehensive, and intersubjective judgments. One of the fundamental issues that has been raised since the beginning of the history of philosophical thought is how to achieve universality, certainty, and validity of scientific judgments and empirical laws. Great philosophers such as Aristotle, Hume, and Kant have each responded to this issue with their own approaches and epistemological foundations. The present study examines their views on the foundations of empirical judgments using an analytical and critical method, and shows that Aristotle's view is based on metaphysical foundations and Kant's on physical foundations, which has led to the acceptance of the necessity and universality of empirical judgments in their perspective. In contrast, Hume, who lacks such metaphysical or physical foundations, does not accept the universality and necessity of empirical judgments. The explanation of these theories shows that the point of support for these philosophers in giving universality and certainty to scientific laws is the principle of causality. However, each of them has a different view of the principle of causality based on their specific philosophical foundations, which has led to differences in accepting the necessity and universality of empirical judgments. This study emphasizes that a precise understanding of the assumptions and intellectual foundations has played a decisive role in understanding how empirical judgments are formed and validated in the eyes of these philosophers, and has led to a better understanding of the causes of agreement and disagreement in their philosophy .

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